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Abstract: Determining the offset and sterilization coefficients of the central bank could be useful in 
terms of measuring of the scope and the stance of the monetary policy. The purpose of this paper is to 
measure the sterilization and offset coefficient and degree of the relation between the Central Bank’s 
reactions and the macroeconomic variables. Additionally, neutralization coefficient was calculated. 
Estimations were done on a monthly basis and in two different sub-periods, from 1990 to 1993 and 1995 
to 1999. The results showed that in the first period which is the pre-crisis period (1990-1993), low 
degree of sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficients, which suggest that the CBRT implemented 
a relatively accommodative policy to fiscal policy by expanding domestic credits to finance budget 
deficit. In contrast, in the second period which is the post-crisis period (1995-1999), the CBRT 
implemented more active policy by sterilizing most of the foreign assets increase and neutralizing the 
government credits by reducing the banking sector credits which was reflected in the high level of 
sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficient. In addition, in the second period, the CBRT gave 
importance to the stability of the markets more evidently by injecting the required liquidity. Finally, the 
link between high sterilisation and low inflation accepted generally as a rule in the literature were not 
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I-Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the sterilisation and offset coefficient and 
degree of the relation between the Central Bank’s reactions and the macroeconomic 
variables by estimating the monetary policy reaction function on a monthly basis. The 
offset and sterilisation coefficients, together with monetary policy reaction to inflation 
itself, measure the extent to which monetary policy is accommodating or used 
systematically for monetary control. This paper applies previously developed 
methodologies
1 to study monetary policy in Turkey for the period of 1990-1999 in 
which Turkey decided to liberalise its capital account completely in 1989. This period 
also includes 1994 financial crisis, which hit the economy seriously during that time.  
Altınkemer (1998) estimates the domestic credit reaction function of CBRT by 
dividing the estimation period into two sub-periods, February 1990-October 1993 and 
April 1994-June 1998. She concludes that, during the pre-financial crisis period, it 
seems that the CBRT was reacting to changes in net foreign assets (NFA), real 
exchange rate and not to interest differential. While in the post financial crisis period, 
it seems that the CBRT reacted more to NFA changes compared to the pre-crisis 
period and also interest rate differentials gained importance in the monetary policy 
framework. The sterilization coefficients have been found as 1.04 and 0.93 for the 
first and second periods respectively by using OLS. However, Kouri and Porter 
(1974) and Obstfeld (1982) point out in the case of sterilization, the offset coefficient 
is subject to a possible sterilization bias. The source of the bias is the possible 
endogeneity of NDA. If capital inflow is systematically sterilized, the change in NDA 
will be correlated with the disturbance term in the NFA equation (or capital-flow 
equation), therefore OLS estimates will be inconsistent. To remedy this problem, 
Argy and Kouri (1974) and Obstfeld suggest that the offset and sterilization equations 
be estimated by two-stage least squares using instrumental variables. 
Celasun and Denizer (1999) also examines sterilization of capital flows as part of a 
study mainly focused on the determinants of capital flows, their impact on the real 
sectors of the Turkish economy, macroeconomic management issues that relate to 
capital flows together with the banking intermediation of capital flows and issues 
surrounding the process. In (Celasun, Denizer), Central Bank sterilization reaction 
function, with consideration of the endogeneity problem, was estimated based on the 
methodology of Cumby and Obstfeld (1983). Net domestic assets
2 (NDA) item is 
                                                           
1 Altınkemer, M. (1998), Celasun O, C. Denizer, and D. He (1999) 
2 Including revaluation account and adjusted for reserve requirements   2
estimated by using two-stage least squares, for the period February 1990 to June 
1996. The reaction function allows net domestic assets to respond to other variables, 
such as, net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT), real exchange 
rate, real GDP and consolidated government deficit
3. For the whole period, the 
sterilization coefficient was found as 0.37, which indicated that 37 percent of reserve 
flows were sterilized within a month (given that lags of NFA proved insignificant). 
Unlike our results, they concluded that the Central Bank engaged in relatively more 
active sterilization and pursued a tighter stance in the pre-1993 period. However, 
NDA reaction function of the CBRT has been estimated through whole period, during 
which NDA exhibits different characteristics. 
The main motivation of this study is to determine the monetary policy reaction 
function of CBRT. Contribution of this study are twofold. First, some macroeconomic 
variables as exogenous other than the main financial variables are included. Second, 
we have sub-divided NDA into two components, which are net credits to private 
sector and public sector. Then, we estimated “net credits to private sector” instead of 
total NDA by putting net credits to the government sector as the explanatory variable 
besides other exogenous variables. In that equation, the coefficient of net credits to 
government sector measures the “neutralization” coefficient that is expected to lie 
between zero and minus one. While monetary control dictates complete 
neutralisation of increased government borrowing from the system, the factors 
influencing the government’s credit requirements may well affect the banking sector’s 
credit demands in a similar way. A passive or accommodating monetary policy would 
then sanction increases in banking sector domestic credit along with increased 
government borrowing. In this case, the estimated neutralisation coefficient would be 
positive. 
An organization of the paper as follows: In section II, the monetary policy 
implementation in Turkey in a historical perspective together with instruments of 
monetary management under the constraints of fiscal dominance and sustainability 
of current account balances was given. Section III presents the literature survey and 
section IV goes into the estimation results. The last section concludes.  
                                                           
3 Including instrumental variables; constant, monthly dummies, three lags of the dependent and conditioning variables, 6 lags of 
net foreign assets, uncovered interest parity and three lags of it.   3
II- Conduct of Monetary Policy in Turkey with the Historical Background 
1991-1993: Pre-crisis Period 
The Turkish economy entered into a new stage of development that envisaged an 
outward oriented economy based on free market forces with the January 24
th 
measures in 1980. Starting from this date, financial liberalisation process was 
realised gradually through some new regulations such as determining the exchange 
rates by the Central Bank, setting interest rates free, permitting to residents to hold 
foreign exchange deposits freely, establishing the interbank money market and 
Istanbul Stock Exchange and starting to use indirect monetary policy instruments in 
policy implementation. Finally, in 1989, the capital account was fully liberalised.  
Initial effect of capital account liberalisation was rapid capital inflow to the Turkish 
economy through both borrowing from international markets by the banking sector 
and increasing portfolio investments to the Istanbul Stock Exchange. As a result, the 
sum of the current and capital accounts was in surplus during the period except for 
1991 when uncertainties surrounding the Gulf War led to a substantial capital 
outflow. The modest expansion in 1989 was followed by an aggregate demand-led 
boom in 1990 and a sharp contraction in 1991, the latter reflecting uncertainties 
surrounding the Gulf crisis.  
As to monetary policy, on the other hand, for the first time the CBRT announced a 
monetary program in a medium term horizon in 1990
4. With the monetary program 
the CBRT tried to control the credits extended to the public sector, thus the domestic 
assets and increase the share of Turkish lira liabilities in the balance sheet. As a 
result, the balance sheet targets of the first monetary program were realised in some 
sense. The net foreign liability of the CBRT declined but was still negative. The cash 
credits to public sector declined in nominal terms but the credits to banking sector 
increased in real terms, in sum the cash credits to public sector and banking sector 
did not change in nominal terms in 1990 but declined in real terms. Although the 
revaluation account had not change as proposed, the control on the CBRT credits 
enabled to stay in the total domestic assets target interval. The share of the “central 
bank money” increased but it was not remarkable since CBRT financed its assets 
partly by creating foreign liabilities.  
Because of the uncertainties created by the Gulf crises, CBRT did not announce a 
monetary program in 1991 and pursued a policy, which would bring the instability in 
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the exchange rates to the minimum levels, without incurring large losses in the 
foreign reserves. As a result of the huge increase in the cash credits to the public 
sector, domestic assets could not be controlled. But the movements of the central 
bank money were in the desired direction and its growth rate was higher than that of 
the total domestic liabilities. Although there was contraction in the economy, inflation 
accelerated, due to rapidly rising public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) and its 
increased monetary financing through CBRT credits.  
In the 1992-1993 period, the economy rebounded strongly. This was associated with 
strong import growth, large increase in public and private sector real wages, and 
further deterioration in fiscal balances resulting in increased recourse to central bank 
financing (Agenor, Mc Dermott and Üçer (1997)). Indeed, there was a lack of fiscal 
discipline in 1992 and 1993. In 1992, a monetary program was designed under 
several assumptions related to inflation, the consolidated budget deficit, and the 
public sector's borrowing from the CBRT. However, the rapid expansion of the credits 
extended to the public sector made it impossible for the CBRT to comply with the 
monetary program targets, and instead it strove to eliminate excessive fluctuations in 
the exchange rates. The exchange rate policy quite different in 1992 compared with 
the period 1989-1990, and CBRT did not allow the exchange rates to appreciate and 
the exchange rate basket depreciated by 2 percentage points in 1992. The 
deterioration in fiscal accounts should be the main driving force for CBRT to not 
letting exchange rates to appreciate during the period 1991-1993.  
In 1993, CBRT did not announce a monetary program because of the difficulty in 
controlling its balance sheet items due to the inability in controlling the financing 
needs of the public sector, trying to prevent the pressures of the increasing liquidity 
on the foreign exchange rate without reserve losses. Monetary developments in 1993 
once again dominated by the deficit of the consolidated budget deficit. The main 
policy objective was maintaining the stability in the money and foreign exchange 
market. The CBRT’s credits to agricultural sector grew by 96,6 percent in 1993. The 
contribution of net domestic assets (NDA) to reserve money growth was 95 percent. 
The CBRT did not sterilise the capital inflows and created the money by domestic 
credit expansion. Thus, the CBRT foreign exchange reserves did not increase and 
kept its previous year level. The real effective exchange rate was almost constant 
compared with the previous year but there was still 10 percent appreciation at the 
end of 1993, which was the residual of the 1989-1990 monetary program.    5
In 1993, public sector borrowing requirement continued to rise and reached 12 
percent of GNP that was highest ever recorded. Primary deficit of the consolidated 
budget continued in 1993, as was the case in 1991 and 1992. Non-interest 
expenditures jumped due to the “other transfers” item of the budget and interest 
payments exhibited the most dynamic expansion and reached a record level with 5,8 
percent of GNP due to lagged effects of Gulf War and 1992 parliamentary elections. 
Another factor, which boosted interest payments in 1993, was the shortening of the 
maturity of the debt stock. The increase in credits, public sector expenditures and 
real wages boosted the economy and economy grew by 8.1 percent, which was the 
highest economic growth rate after 1990. Strong consumption and private investment 
led to rapid deterioration in current account and current account deficit reached 3,5 
percent of GNP at the end of 1993.  
In the last months of 1993, government tried to decrease the cost of domestic 
borrowing. For this purpose, in some of the auctions, the government either did not 
borrow or borrowed small amounts, despite the increasing fiscal deficit. Furthermore, 
the Treasury relied heavily on CBRT resources and created excess liquidity in the 
market, which put pressure on foreign exchange rates so that the margin between 
market and official exchange rate started to widen in the last quarter of 1993. The 
rating agencies downgraded the Turkish economy during that time. These 
developments triggered the financial crisis, which stemmed not only from worsening 
macroeconomic fundamentals but also debt mismanagement as well. At that time 
one of main disadvantages of the CBRT was that the level of foreign exchange 
reserves of the Bank was low compared to the level of Banks’ open foreign exchange 
(FX) positions (almost 75 percent of reserves). The government devaluated the 
currency and took some measures on the 5
th of April including tight monetary and 
fiscal policy and structural reforms. The results of the crisis were destructive. The 
economy contracted by 6.1 percent. Nominal interest rate of government securities 
reached 100 percent. The maturity of the debt stock shortened to 4 months. Despite 
some success in fiscal adjustment, the PSBR increased again after 1995 raising 
inflationary expectations. 
1995-1999: Post-crisis Period 
The 1994 financial crisis heavily influenced the monetary policy of the CBRT. The 
balance sheet of the Bank took a new form. Typical IMF conditionality in the context 
of ceiling on “net domestic assets” and floor on “net international reserves” together 
with an unannounced predetermined exchange rate path were the main   6
“performance criteria” of the monetary authority as part of the Stand-by agreement. 
However, after the financial crisis the maturity of the debt stock was shortened and 
the destructive results of the crisis was heavily seen on the fiscal balances of the 
Turkish economy in 1995. As a result of less recourse to foreign borrowing, the 
Treasury heavily resorted to domestic borrowing in financing the increased budget 
deficit that exerted heavy pressure on the financial system. On the other hand, the 
real depreciation of the TL in 1994 again led to increase in exports and current 
account deficit decreased to 1,4 percent of the GNP. Again capital inflows 
accelerated in 1995 and the economic growth was above its potential again and 
reached 8,1 percent. The source of the growth was not only domestic consumption 
but private investment as well.  
The Stand-by arrangement came to end at September 1995 since the election 
atmosphere forced CBRT to a more supportive monetary policy. On the inflation front 
1995 was a partially successful year, inflation declined to 65,6 percent that was 149,6 
percent in 1994. However lack of fiscal discipline together with unresolved structural 
imbalances including rehabilitation of banking system dominated the Turkish 
economy after that time. Between years 1989-1993, which was pre-crisis period, 
average inflation rate was around 60s. After the crisis, inflation rate moved to an 
upper plateau of 80s until 1998. 
During 1996-1997, the CBRT centred its monetary policy implementation on 
achieving stability in financial markets rather than decreasing the inflation rate. The 
fiscal dominated environment together with a permanent crisis memory and the 
failure of weak coalition governments to deal with structural problems resulted in the 
economy operating under a cloud of vulnerability, particularly in terms of worsening 
debt dynamics together with increase in country’s risk premium. Under these 
conditions, the CBRT implemented its monetary and exchange rate policy without 
announcing any operating targets. However the monitored balance sheet structure 
was almost same with the previous two years. Since the short term advances to 
Treasury were limited by the Law and credits were not extended to the other public 
sector institutions, the CBRT managed to control the growth of the domestic assets 
and increased the domestic liabilities in return for increase in foreign assets. 
Exchange rate policy was conducted in line with the forecasted inflation rates. This 
policy ensured not only real effective exchange rate stability but competitiveness in 
the export sector and a sustainable current account deficit as well. Besides this, 
unlike 1989-93 period, Central Bank official reserves reached to 21 billion US dollar 
as of October 1997 compared to the level of 6 billion US dollar at the end of 1993   7
which enhanced the CBRT’s resistance to speculative attacks experienced both in 
Asian crisis in the second half of 1997 and Russian crisis in August 1998. Wholesale 
price inflation which decreased to 65 percent by the end of 1995 following the 
financial crisis, returned to an increasing trend in 1996 and this trend continued in 
1997 reaching to 91 percent.  
CBRT again announced its monetary program in 1998. For the first and second 
quarter of the year, “reserve money” target bands were announced together with the 
expected inflation rates. Besides this, Treasury also announced quarterly budget 
“primary surplus” targets. However, the overall program was not comprehensive i.e. 
lack of structural reform agenda. The only positive step was that the “tax reform” 
which was launched on July 1998. During that time, the bands were determined 
through money demand projections by considering the expected income and inflation 
figures for the first half of the year. The targeted levels were designed according to a 
modest remonetization rate in the economy on one side and thought as a buffer for 
any external shock together with including seasonal factors on currency 
developments on the other side. The reserve money targets were realized below the 
projected lower band. 
As to inflation, decreasing trend in interest rates with heavy short-term capital flows 
together with a decline in inflationary expectations on one side and the realised 
favourable figures both on the budget and monetary side on the other side 
contributed to decrease in inflation rates in the first half of the year. 
In June, Turkey signed a “Staff Monitoring Program” (SMP) with the Fund. In that 
context, the CBRT announced a six-month monetary program. According to this 
program, a new definition of “net domestic assets” item was defined and targeted. In 
line with the consultations done with the IMF Staff, the target for the “reserve money” 
was not announced to the public. Given a “net foreign assets” and “reserve money 
(X)” projections, the target for “net domestic assets” was determined. The main 
reasons behind this new monetary policy framework were as follows: 
In many developing countries, the Central Banks’ control over its balance sheet tends to be incomplete. 
Changes in net foreign assets which is a reflection of the balance of payments outcome, cannot 
generally be considered to be a fully policy-controlled variable. Although the Central Bank could, to 
some extent, counteract exogenous shocks to the reserves and/or resist the monetization of the fiscal 
deficit, in practice the most controllable factor compared to others remains claims on commercial banks. 
Another important issue (with respect to reserve money) is that during disinflation, estimating the rate of 
re-monetization of an economy following a period of high inflation is very difficult. Policy simulations with 
regard to money demand applications implicitly assumes that de-monetization and re-monetization are 
symmetric processes. However in practice these elasticities are generally not same.(Erçel, 1998)   8
As can be followed from the Graph 1 in Appendix A
5, during the first half of the year 
(especially March-June period), due to rapid short-term capital inflows, the share of 
changes in “net foreign assets” in the initial stock of reserve money is positive. Thus, 
this was the period, where the secondary market interest rates were stayed between 
the CBRT’s official interest rate corridor (interbank money market). However, starting 
from the middle of July; uncertainty created by the controversies over civil servant’s 
salary rises, early election and withholding tax debates and thus increases in 
inflationary expectations and the Russian crises in August reversed the trend of 
interest rates. This was the period during which the source of the growth of reserve 
money was the increase in net domestic assets. Moreover, the Russian crisis 
observed during that time, limited the chance of the Treasury to find loans in 
international markets. This development increased the dependence of Treasury to 
domestic borrowing which exerted upward pressure on domestic interest rates. The 
observed foreign capital outflow in last months of the year triggered the interest rate 
hikes. Therefore, in October, the end-of-year target of the “net domestic assets” was 
revised towards an upper level, which indicates a more loose monetary policy. 
Besides the all efforts of the Central Bank, the year ended with high real interest 
rates which increased the burden of future domestic interest payments on the budget 
that lead to worsening domestic debt dynamics in 1999 and the economy entered 
into a recession. But year-end inflation stayed around 50’s as targeted (Erçel 1998).  
The policy implementation under SMP agreement continued in 1999. NDA targets 
were determined loosely under the assumption of neutral NFA position. However, 
capital inflows were again more than expected which led to CBRT to carry out the 
NDA targets despite the election environment in the first half of the year and the 
earthquake in the second half. The real burden of the Russian crises was observed 
in that year. The economy contracted by 6 percent in line with contraction in both 
domestic and external demand. Although the “primary balance” targets were hold 
during the year, overall public sector deficit deterioration and rapid increase in 
interest payments prevented to keep the public sector price inflation under control. 
Since SMP was seen as a bridge for a future comprehensive disinflation program, 
the Central Bank expressed its views with regard to inflation target by choosing a rate 
of crawl it deems acceptable allows for no doubts about the sustainability of the 
chosen exchange regime especially under constraints of both current account and 
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fiscal sustainability and rapid changes of directions and volume of short-term capital 
flows (and thus the level of foreign exchange reserves). 
The CBRT moved to an exchange rate policy based on forward-looking inflation 
targets as part of a disinflation programme backed by the Fund on the 1
st of January 
2000. The announcement of the program with its pre-determined daily exchange rate 
path on a sliding 12-month horizon was done on the 9
th of December 1999. Thus, a 
new monetary policy framework has been introduced (Erçel 1999).  
Thus, in the context of the above historical background, it is possible to examine the 
1989-1999 period in two sub-periods as pre-1994 and after 1994.  
During 1989-1993 period, the CBRT mostly did not sterilise the capital inflows, 
heavily extend direct cash credits to Treasury and did not tighten enough the credits 
extended to banking sector. With non-sterilised intervention policy, the CBRT did not 
accumulate the necessary foreign exchange reserves to defend the domestic 
currency in case of speculative attacks. In the second period, which was between 
1995-1999, the Bank chose the sterilised intervention policy. The result was sound 
current account balances, strong FX reserves, coping with external shocks without 
incurring heavy losses but increased burden of interest payments on the budget and 
thus unsustainable domestic debt dynamics. 
The distinction between these two periods was that the monetary policy was re-
shaped in line of the argument, which the 1994 currency crises showed that non-
sterilised intervention should not be a policy option in case of unsustainable fiscal 
stance.    10
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III-Theoretical Framework 
In theory, the main goal of the monetary policy for most central banks is to maintain 
the internal and external value of the domestic currency. The ultimate objective of 
most of the central banks is to keep inflation low and steady. Thus, most central 
banks attempt to control it indirectly through affecting interest rates or the quantity of 
monetary aggregates. In addition, in the open economy, the central bank cannot 
implement both an independent domestic monetary policy – whether on interest rates 
or the money supply- and the exchange rate policy. If it has independent target for 
interest rates, for example, it will have to accept the market-determined exchange 
rate. If, on the other hand, it targets the exchange rate it will have to accept the 
interest rates (and the quantity of domestic money) necessary to keep the exchange 
rate stable (Gray and Hoggart; 1996). On the other hand the central bank can 
temporarily set both domestic monetary policy and exchange rate. This could be 
achieved through sterilised intervention in which central bank offsets the monetary 
impact of its foreign exchange operations. In this point, as parallel to the aim of this 
study, the issue of different types of exchange rate systems should be analysed 
separately. 
When the exchange rate is fixed, to maintain the official parity, the central bank must 
intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying high-powered money with foreign 
reserves. In this manner, attempts to alter the domestic source component of the 
monetary base are impeded, even in the short run, by offsetting movements in its 
foreign source component. If the offset to domestic credit expansion is complete, the 
monetary base is determined independently of the central bank’s policies by the 
saving and portfolio decisions of the public. The central bank can affect the monetary 
base only when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. If there is 
perfect substitutability, the capital account offset to domestic credit measures is 
immediate and complete, provided there are no lags in portfolio adjustments 
(Obstfeld 1982). When the exchange rate is flexible, the level of exchange rate is 
determined by the supply and demand of currency. In this system, the nominal 
money supply becomes a policy determined variable and as in the fixed exchange 
rate, the central bank can attain independent monetary management only if there is 
imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets.  
In this point, two concepts emerge: Offset coefficient and sterilisation coefficient. 
Offset coefficient indicates the fraction of any domestic credit expansion reversed by 
central bank foreign reserve losses in the same period while sterilisation coefficient   12
indicates that the degree of sterilisation which is offset in the inflows so as to leave 
the overall money supply unaffected through open market operations or some other 
monetary regulations like reserve requirements. 
Under those mentioned above, determining the offset and sterilisation coefficients of 
the central bank could be useful in terms of measuring of the scope and the stance of 
the monetary policy. Indeed, this issue has discussed in the literature by several 
authors. They all estimated a reaction function for monetary policy and assessed the 
sterilisation and offset coefficient. In Kamas (1986) for Mexico and Venezuela, in 
Renhack and Mondino (1988) for Colombia, in Fry, Lilien and Wadhwa (1991) and 
Fry(1996) for Pacific Basin Countries, Savvides (1998) for West and Central African 
Countries, the offset and the sterilisation coefficients were estimated to measure the 
degree of monetary independence or performance of monetary policy. On the other 
hand, in Siklos (1996) and Arvai (1997) for Hungary, Altınkemer (1998) for Turkey 
and in Celasun-Denizer (1999) for Turkey, sterilisation policy was examined.  
In those studies, monetary policy reaction functions were estimated where the 
reduced form equations were not derived from a general macroeconomic model. 
Whereas in Kamas (1986), a reduced form equation was derived from a general 
macroeconomic model. On the other hand, there are some issues related to these 
two approaches. Obstfeld (1982) indicates that the structural approach suffers from 
several disadvantages relative to the reduced-form approach. For example, it may be 
less robust with respect to certain specification errors in structural equations. Also, 
unlike the reduced form approach, it cannot be implemented when there is unlimited 
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. However, the structural 
approach avoids an important econometric problem that may bias reduced-form 
estimates. 
As to methodology, various estimation techniques were used: Ordinary least square , 
two stage least squares, iterative three stage least squares, vector autoregression 
models etc. Among these, since the application of OLS method to an equation 
belonging to a system of simultaneous equations yields biased and inconsistent 
estimates, the obvious solution is to apply other methods of estimation.  
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Table 2 
Sterilization and Offset Coefficients in Developing Countries 
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(1) Kamas made estimations in the context of three different specifications: the monetarist, the portfolio balance, and 
Keynesian. 
(2) Two types of domestic credit policies were defined. First is the helicopter drop and second is the open market 
operation.  
(3) Indonesia, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
(4) The 27 individual country equations for capital flow ratios are estimated as a system of equations with cross-
equation restrictions on all coefficients except the intercept. 
Actually it could not be said for most of these studies to reach a firm conclusion 
concerning the offset and sterilisation coefficients which change according to 
choosing, definition, and calculation of the variables like in Kamas(1985), Kamas 
(1986), Siklos(1996), Renhack, Mondino (1988). In Roubini (1988), on the other 
hand, it is emphasized that there is no unique offset and sterilisation coefficient; that 
is, these coefficients are changing according to the different disturbances hitting the 
economy and the preferences of the monetary authorities. However, it may be useful 
to estimate offset and sterilisation coefficients for policy analysis.    14
Generally in these studies, small offset coefficient and high sterilisation are evaluated 
as the indicator of independent and effective monetary policy leading to low level of 
inflation and moderate and sustainable macroeconomic balances whatever the 
exchange rate system is. These coefficients together with the neutralisation 
coefficient
6  also help to determine the relationship between monetary and fiscal 
policy. As a matter of fact that in Fry (1998) this issue was examined with the sample 
of 70 developing countries and found that larger deficits and greater reliance by 
governments on the inflation tax and financial repression are associated both with 
less sterilisation of increased net foreign assets and with less neutralisation of 
increased government borrowing requirements. In this point, another inference 
concerning Mexico worths to mention. As seen from the Table 2, offset coefficient is 
very small while sterilisation is not found. During the period of estimation, the 
Mexican government played a large role in the economy by utilising the foreign 
borrowing extensively to finance current account and budget deficit. Venezuela, in 
contrast, represent the case of a smaller role for the government, and estimated 
coefficients are in accordance with the predictions of theory. In addition, the small 
offset coefficient can indicate limited capital movements or exchange rate policy co-
ordinated with monetary policy as suggested by Fry(1996) for the Pacific Basin 
Countries. Indeed, this issue was confirmed by Moreno(1996) for Korea that had 
more restrictive capital controls in the 1981-1994 period and found that it may be 
more insulated from foreign asset shocks
7.  
IV- Methodology and Estimates of the Offset and Sterilisation Coefficient for 
Turkey  
When a central bank follows a sterilisation policy, domestic credits will be an 
endogenous variable, since, domestic credits are varied in response to the change in 
foreign assets. Also “foreign assets” is an endogenous variable since domestic credit 
expansion is offset by a fall in foreign exchange reserves. As a result, domestic credit 
will be correlated with the error term in the foreign assets equation while the foreign 
assets will be correlated with the error term in the domestic credit equation. The 
following behavioural simultaneous equation system was created.  
           ∆NDAt = a1∆NFAt + a2X1t + u1t                             
           ∆NFAt = b1∆NDAt + b2X2t + u2t                             
                                                           
6 Neutralization indicates the decrease in the amount of private sector credits when the government 
credits expand.   15
∆NDA
8 and ∆NFA are the change in the domestic assets and the foreign assets in 
the balance sheet of the central bank, respectively. Xit is a vector of other explanatory 
variables postulated to affect the changes in domestic and foreign assets. 
In equation (1), the parameter a1 is an indicator of the degree of sterilisation of net 
foreign assets. a1 measures how much of a change in net foreign assets deriving 
from interventions in the exchange rate market is sterilised by the monetary 
authorities. The coefficient ranges from zero to minus one. If a1=-1, the sterilisation is 
complete while a1>-1, the degree of sterilisation is less than full. In equation (2), the 
parameter b1 is the offset coefficient. Offset coefficient gives the amount of capital 
outflow per domestic currency of expansion of domestic credit. b1 is close to –1 if 
domestic and foreign assets are close substitutes, indicating a high degree of capital 
mobility and a low degree of control over the money stock. If the b1 close to 0, a high 
degree of monetary control and a low degree of capital mobility are available.  
In this framework, we estimated the following equation system:             
∆NDAt = a0 + a1∆NFAt-i + a21 ∆BUDGETt-i + a22INFt-i + a23VINTt-i + a24Gt-i+u1t       (1’) 
∆NFAt = b0 + b1∆NDAt-i +b21∆NDAt-i + b22CAPt-i +b23CURt-i+b24PRIMt-i + u2t             (2’) 
Equation (1’) is the monetary policy reaction function of the CBRT. All the nominal 
variables used in terms of US dollar. ∆NDA is the change in net domestic assets of 
the CBRT excluding revaluation account. ∆NFA is the change in net foreign assets of 
CBRT and its coefficient indicates sterilisation degree. The variables out of ∆NFA are 
postulated to affect monetary policy. In other words, these variables were put into 
equation to capture the respond of CBRT to changes in these variables. ∆BUDGET 
is the change in primary budget deficit, INF is the monthly WPI inflation, and G is the 
annual real output growth rate. Industrial production is used as a proxy for output 
since monthly GDP series is not available. VINT is the volatility of short-term interest 
rates (weighted average of overnight interest rates in the interbank money market 
and the İstanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) Repo-Reverse Repo Market) measured by 
the moving standard deviation method with the order of six
9. We used this variable to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 In Moreno(1996) a VAR model for Korea and Taiwan was estimated using monthly data to analyse 
the monetary implications of intervention and sterilization policies.  
8 “∆” denotes a change in the variable 
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see whether the CBRT implemented a monetary policy observing financial stability as 
stated in the previous section and how it did.  
In equation (2’), the coefficient of ∆NDA, b1, indicate the offset coefficient. The other 
explanatory variables show the possible source of foreign assets changes. CAP is 
the capital account, CUR is the current account, and PRIM indicates the spread 
between devaluation rate adjusted by the cost of foreign exchange and weighted 
average of overnight interest rates in the interbank money market and the ISE Repo-
Reverse Repo Market. PRIM can be thought as the indicator of demand factor which 
generally proxied by the output in other studies. Increase in PRIM means that the 
cost of funding via selling foreign exchange to CBRT is lower for the banks, i.e. net 
foreign assets increases, that is, the expected sign of coefficients of PRIM is positive 
like CAP and CUR.  
We estimated the system with two-stage least square (2SLS) method with the 
monthly data for 1990-1999 period.  
We employed augmented Dickey-Fuller Test to check for unit roots and found that all 
variables used are stationary. The instruments are all the predetermined variables, 
constant, and seasonal dummies
10. We implement the experiments in the two sub-
periods excluding the year 1994 in which financial crisis occurred. We carried out 
Chow test to test the presence of a structural break statistically and rejected the null 




















                                                           
10 We estimate the system with the longer lag instruments but the results did not change. The results 
were not reported to save the space. 



















































































(1)  The equations are estimated using two-stage least squares method. The instruments used are all the 
predetermined variables and seasonal dummies. (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) 
indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and the three stars (***) indicate significance at the 10 percent 
level. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The most striking result is the difference of the sterilization and offset coefficients in 
each period. In the second period, which is post-crises, absolute values of both 
coefficients are considerably high compared to the first period.  
The estimate of the offset coefficient is -0,29 in the first period. For every one unit of 
an expansion of net domestic assets, -0,29 unit of net foreign assets flow out. After 
the crisis, this offset coefficient is -0,78. This means that, in the second period, 
capital mobility increased and the CBRT cannot affect the money supply by 
controlling or influencing domestic credit in the short run. However this also was a 
reflection of Treasury’s net repayer position in terms of foreign debt. In other words, 
the Treasury paid part of its foreign debt through CBRT FX reserves in return for TL 
that was an influential factor on this high level of offset coefficient in the second 
period. The estimated sterilisation coefficient is -0,88 in the second period while -0,54 
in the first period indicating partial sterilization although higher than our expectation. 
This suggests that the CBRT has been able to insulate the economy from the 
monetary effects of reserve flows. 
In NDA equation, the estimated coefficient for the second lag of primary budget 
deficit is significantly positive in the pre-crisis period. In the first period, CBRT   18
increased the net domestic assets when output growth increase which could be 
evaluated as accommodation at least part of additional domestic demand stemmed 
from increase in government expenditures through an expansion of domestic credit. 
In the second period, we couldn’t observe any relationship among net domestic 
assets and budget deficits and output. There is no significant relationship between 
net domestic assets and inflation in all periods. These results consistently suggest 
that the CBRT implemented a monetary policy accommodating to fiscal deficit and 
domestic demand until 1994. Since “short-term advances to Treasury” were heavily 
curtailed in the second period, we may not observe any relation between deficit and 
NDA in the second period. The estimated coefficient of VINT is positive significantly 
in the second period. This result is consistent with the CBRT’s policy goal of stability 
in both TL and foreign exchange markets by the help of exchange rate policy, 
liquidity management techniques and the interest rate policy, which are consistent 
with the conducted fiscal policy.  
In the NFA equation, the estimated coefficient of the capital account and current 
account are positive significantly in all periods as expected. The estimated coefficient 
of PRIM marginally significant in the second period while considerably significant in 
the first period. This is not surprising when considered the fact that the level of open 
FX positions of the banking system increased dramatically compared to the level of 
CBRT FX reserves and reached to 75 percent of official FX reserves at the end of 
1993 as seen from Graph 1 in Appendix A.  
Second Trial 
We also estimated the equations by using “net credits to private sector” (CRDPRIV) 
instead of total net domestic assets. We obtained net credits to private sector (sum of 
“open market operation (OMO) stock”, “credits to banking sector” and “other items”) 
by excluding the net credits to government sector from the total net domestic assets. 
In the second step, we used the net credits to government sector (CRDGOV) as 
explanatory variable in the reaction function to measure the neutralization coefficient. 
The estimated coefficient for this variable is expected to lie between zero and minus 
1. A coefficient of -1 would imply that the central bank neutralizes completely the 
public sector’s credit requirements by cutting back credit to the private sector. Partial 
neutralization, on the other hand, produces a coefficient less than zero but greater 
than -1, and no neutralization entails a coefficient of zero. An accommodating 
monetary policy would increase in private sector domestic credit along with increased   19
government borrowing from central bank. In this case, the estimated neutralization 
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(*)The equations are estimated using two-stage least squares method. The instruments used are all the predetermined variables 
and seasonal dummies. One star (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, two stars (**) indicate statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level, and the three stars (***) indicate significance at the 10 percent level. Figures in parentheses 
are t-statistics. 
In this situation, sterilization and offset coefficients changed considerably, indicating 
no sterilization and offset in the first period. Also in Fry (1998) this phenomenon was 
detected for Turkey in 1980’s. Fry consider this the evidence of financing of 
investment and growth by expanding domestic credit. On the other hand, in our 
sample period, when considered together with the low neutralisation coefficient, one 
can see that the CBRT implemented a relatively accommodative policy to fiscal 
policy by expanding domestic credits to finance budget deficit. In contrast, in the 
second period, the CBRT implemented more active policy by sterilising most of the 
foreign assets increase and neutralising the government credits by reducing the 
banking sector credits. Finally, although the offset coefficient in the second period 
seems to counteract monetary autonomy, it supports the findings of effective 
monetary policy when evaluated together with the high sterilisation and 
neutralisation. When considered that period including Asian and Russian crisis, it 
may reflect how the economic agents become more vulnerable after the domestic 
and external crisis. On the other hand, other relationships showed the same pattern 
as in the first trial with marginal differences (Table 4).   20
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have estimated the CBRT's monetary policy reaction function with 
the structural equation system to measure the performance of monetary policy and 
evaluate the relationship between monetary policy and macroeconomic variables 
together with the sterilisation, offset and neutralisation coefficient. 
According to the results of the estimations, the way CBRT implemented its policy 
indicated different characteristics in 1990-1993 and 1995-1999 periods. In the first 
period, low degree of sterilisation, offset and neutralisation coefficients suggest that 
the CBRT implemented a relatively accommodative policy to fiscal policy by 
expanding domestic credits to finance budget deficit. In contrast, in the second 
period, the CBRT implemented more active policy by sterilizing most of the foreign 
assets increase and neutralizing the expansion of government credits by reducing 
the banking sector credits which was reflected in the high level of sterilisation, offset 
and neutralisation coefficients. In addition, in the second period, the CBRT gave 
priority to the stability of the financial markets more evidently by injecting Turkish Lira 
and/or foreign exchange when needed.  
However, especially in the last two years, the banking sector was in a net debtor 
position to CBRT. During that time the CBRT supplied just the required daily need of 
the market at higher costs, which facilitated the Treasury’s domestic borrowing 
strategy. In order to prevent sharp portfolio switch of market participants from 
domestic currency to foreign exchange, the CBRT did not let short-term market 
interest rates to fall to levels which was not consistent with its nominal devaluation 
rate of the exchange rate basket (plus the cost of holding FX for banks and risk 
premium compatible with the conditions of that time). Although the link between high 
sterilisation and low inflation accepted generally as a rule in the literature, we did not 
observe this situation in Turkish case since sterilisation policies may easily end up 
with high real interest rates in the economy. Normally in low inflation countries high 
real interest rates can dampen domestic demand, which alleviates inflationary 
pressures. However especially after 1994 crisis, together with the inflationary 
expectations, the risk premium of the country rose which caused the real interest 
rates reach to unsustainable levels, which halted the negative relationship between 
excess demand and inflation.  
The inflation process is driven in part by the pricing behaviour of economic agents in 
the goods and factor markets. The shorter adjustment intervals, which is a 
consequence of change in the pricing behaviour of the producers and is independent   21
from aggregate demand, becomes a crucial factor behind the inflationary dynamics. 
Throughout this information process, inflation dynamics shift from demand-pull 
inflation to an inflationary process where the cost effects are dominant. Taking into 
account that Turkey is a net importer of the most of the intermediate goods, a 
possible surge in the international price level of these goods will result in the 
worsening of the terms of trade and the prices of imported goods again will be 
pushed up which directly increases cost of production. Another important impact of 
this process is that in such an environment, producers expect a permanent 
depreciation of TL without knowing anything about the magnitude of the depreciation, 
which brings an important uncertainty on the replacement cost of the products they 
produce, and they increase the prices of their products to cover the risk of 
replacement cost. As a result, the relationship between demand and prices 
disappears and becomes indeterminate. In other words, in the price determination of 
the private firms replacement cost and mark-up pricing behaviour gains importance. 
The process further feeds the cost-push inflation. 
The estimation results suggest that “sterilisation coefficient” was significantly higher 
after the 1994 currency crisis that was the period a disciplined discretionary monetary 
policy was implemented under the constraints of worsening fiscal balances. Similarly, 
the “offset coefficient” in the second period (between 1995-99) was found 
significantly higher than the first period (between 1990-93). This indicates that after 
the crisis monetary autonomy in Turkey was lost together with faster capital 
movements and increasing burden of domestic borrowing on financial markets. On 
the other hand, CBRT had pursued a strong sterilisation policy in the second period. 
This was consistent with the monetary policy implemented after the 1994 crisis, 
which aimed particularly at stabilising the financial markets. In implementing its 
monetary policy, the CBRT tried to prevent fluctuations in both the Turkish lira and 
foreign exchange markets by focusing on the consistency among Central Bank 
balance sheet items and macro balances of the economy, mainly real exchange 
rates, interest rates and the current account. 
As a result, the policy strategy in the second period was not the best but a better 
strategy and a more sound monetary policy under the constraints of increasing crises 
memory of the economic agents, sustaining current account soundness, worsening 
domestic debt dynamics, and increasing probability of contagion effects of external 
shocks with high capital mobility.    22
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Graph 3 
Net Foreign Assets and Net Domestic Assets 
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Government Credits Private Sector Credits Net Foreign AssetsAPPENDIX: 2 
TABLE 1: MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
   1988  1989 1990  1991  1992 1993  1994 1995 1996  1997 1998  1999  2000 
Real Increase in M1 (2)      5,2 0,1 -12,9 0,9 -3,7  -20,7  -4,5  28,5  -11,4  -4,5 -1,2  11,6 
Real Increase in M2 (2)      5,5  -5,3  -4,4  -1,9  -13,5  -1,0  13,3  29,5  -2,8  19,0  14,1  -6,8 
Real Increase in M2Y (2)       1,6 -5,0  5,2  5,4 -5,9  12,1  14,8 23,8 -0,3 11,7 17,7  2,4 
CPI (1)      64,3 60,4  71,1  66,0 71,1  125,5  76,0 79,8  99,1 69,7  68,8  43,8 
WPI (1)      62,3 48,6  59,2  61,4 60,3  149,6  65,6 84,9  91,0 54,3  62,9  39,1 
Nominal Depreciation of TL vis-a-vis US dollar (1)   78,0  27,5 26,6  73,4  68,6 69,0  165,7  58,9 76,1  90,5 52,7  72,7  33,2 
US dollar (buying rate) (4)  1.813,0 2.311,4 2.927,1 5.074,8 8.555,9  14.458,0 38.418,0 61.054,0 107.505,0 204.750,0 312.720,0 540.098,0  682.883,0 
Nominal Depreciation of TL vis-a-vis German mark (1)   60,2  33,4 42,7  71,5  58,8 57,4  195,7  72,6 62,1  65,4 64,0  47,9  14,1 
German Mark (buying rate) (4)  1.022,9 1.364,5 1.947,5 3.339,8 5.302,7  8.347,6 24.683,0 42.600,0 69.073,0 114.240,0 187.340,0 277.169,0  302.296,0 
Nominal Increase in Exchange Rate Basket (1)   69,4  30,2 34,2  72,4  63,7 63,4  179,6  65,6 69,0  78,2 57,9  61,0  18,9 
Exchange Rate Basket (1,5 DM+ 1 US $) (4)  3.858,7 4.358,0 5.848,4 10.084,5 16.509,8 26.979,4 75.442,5 124.954,0 211.114,5 376.110,0 593.730,0 955.851,5  1.136.327,0 
Real Effective Exchange Rate with WPI (1,5 DM +1 US $) 1987=100 (5)  105,6  86,8 80,4  86,9  89,4 90,9  103,1  100,9 99,8  93,6 95,3  95,1  86,1 
Real GNP (Billion TL) (2)  76.108,0 77.347,0 84.592,0 84.887,0 90.323,0 97.647,0 91.733,0 99.028,0 106.080,0 114.874,3 119.303,1 112.043,8 89.296,6 
GNP growth rate(2)  1,5  1,6 9,4  0,3  6,4 8,1  -6,1  8,0 7,1  8,3 3,8 -6,1  5,4 
Current Account Balance  (Million US dollar) (3)  1.596,0 961,0 -2.625,0  250,0  -974,0 -6.433,0 2.631,0 -2.339,0 -2.437,0 -2.638,0 1.984,0 1.364,0 -6.771,0 
Current Account Balance / GNP (3)  1,8 0,9  -1,7  0,2  -0,6 -3,5 2,0 -1,4  -1,3  -1,4  0,9  0,7  -3,4 
Central Bank Reserves  (Million US dollar) (3)  2.307,0 4.831,0 5.972,0 4.918,0 6.116,0  6.213,0 7.112,0 12.391,0 16.273,0 18.419,0 19.721,0 23.177,0  24.222,0 
Central Bank Reserves / GNP (3)  2,5  4,4 3,9  3,2  3,8 3,4  5,4 7,2 8,8  9,5 9,7 12,1 12,0 
Real Ex-ante Interest Rate On Government Papers (period average) (6)  -7,8  -2,7 -4,7  7,8  9,1 12,9  25,1  18,6 28,6 10,1 16,5 24,2  -19,4 
Real Ex-post Interest Rate On Government Papers (period average) (6)  1,8 -8,0 14,2  9,1  10,3 16,3  16,7 13,2 17,3  7,6  15,7  25,2  na 
Average Maturity of Government Papers (Months) (6)  8,6  14,3  19,2  7,7  7,1 7,2  3,7 6,6 12,3  12,0 7,8 15,8 15,2 
3 months compounded average int.rates (2)  0,0 67,0 56,6  79,2  88,6 82,0  124,6  100,7  108,7  106,5  107,6  120,0  42,2 
3 months time deposits ex-ante real interest rate (2)  0,0 2,3  -2,3  8,0  10,9 9,6 8,9  6,2  15,7 11,2 12,4 33,5  -11,2 
Overnight Rates (4)  83,3  51,0 68,6 109,6 92,2 87,6  591,7  108,2  115,1  102,1  111,2  126,7  54,7 
Revenues (end of period) / in GNP (6)  13,6 13,6 14,24  15,62  16,14 17,6 19,2  17,7  18,0  19,6  21,8  23,9  28,0 
Expenditures other than the Int. Pay. / GNP (6)  12,7 13,3 13,69  17,08  16,77 18,5 15,4  14,4  16,3  19,4  17,2  21,8  21,0 
Total Expenditures / Nominal GNP (6)  16,6 16,9 17,21  20,87  20,42 24,3 23,1  21,8  26,3  27,2  28,8  35,5  37,3 
Interest Payments / Nominal GNP (6)  3,9 3,6 3,52  3,79  3,65 5,8 7,7  7,3  10,0  7,7  11,7 13,7  16,3 
Domestic Interest Payments / Nominal GNP (6)  2,4  2,2 2,4  2,7  2,8 4,6  6,0 6,1 8,9  6,7 10,7  12,6 15,0 
Primary Surplus - Deficit / Nominal GNP (%) (6)  0,9  0,3  0,55  -1,46  -0,64  -0,9  3,8  3,3 1,7 0,1 4,6 2,1  7,0 
Budget Balance / Nominal GNP (6)  -3,0 -3,3  -3,3  -5,25  -4,29 -6,7 -3,9  -4,0  -8,3  -7,6  -7,0  -11,6  -9,3 
Central Bank Reserves / Imports(fob) (3)  2,0  3,6 3,2  2,8  3,2 2,5  3,8 4,2 4,5  4,6 5,2  7,0  5,6 
PSBR/GNP (6)        7,4  10,2  10,6  12,0  7,9  5,0  8,7  7,7  9,0  15,3  10,9 
Foreign Debt Stock/GNP (6)        32,2  33,2  34,6  37,2  50,3  42,7  43,3  43,9  47,3  54,8  54,0 
Domestic Debt Stock / GNP (6)  7,4 6,1 14,4  15,4 17,6 17,9  20,6  17,3 21,0 21,4 21,9 29,3  26,0 
Domestic Debt Stock (billion $) (3)  5,2 6,1  8,3  8,5  15,0 17,6  14,1  18,7 25,8 29,0 37,1 42,4  48,7 
Source: CBRT, SIS, Treasury, SPO                    
1 to 5 belongs year 2000.                    
(1) November-november                    
(2) January-september                    
(3) September                    
(4) End of november                    
(5) October                    
 
 